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In Itamar Pitowsky’s reading of the Gleason and the Kochen-Specker theorems, in particular, his Logical
Indeterminacy Principle, the emphasis is on the value indefiniteness of observables which are not within the
preparation context. This is in stark contrast to the prevalent term contextuality used by many researchers in
informal, heuristic yet omni-realistic and potentially misleading ways. This paper discusses both concepts and
argues in favor of value indefiniteness in all but a continuum of contexts intertwining in the vector represent-
ing a single pure (prepared) state. Even more restrictively, and inspired by operationalism but not justified
by Pitowsky’s Logical Indeterminacy Principle or similar, one could identify with a “quantum state” a single
quantum context – aka the respective maximal observable, or, in terms of its spectral decomposition, the associ-
ated orthonormal basis – from the continuum of intertwining context, as per the associated maximal observable
actually or implicitly measured.
Keywords: Value indefiniteness, Pitowsky’s Logical Indeterminacy Principle, Quantum mechanics, Gleason theorem,
Kochen-Specker theorem, Born rule
I. INTRODUCTION
An upfront caveat seems in order: The following is a
rather subjective narrative of my reading of Itamar Pitowsky’s
thoughts about classical value indeterminacy on quantum log-
ical structures of observables, amalgamated with my current
thinking on related issues. I have never discussed these mat-
ters with Itamar Pitovsky explicitly; therefore the term “my
reading” should be taken rather literally; namely as taken from
his publications. In what follows classical value indefinite-
ness on collections of (intertwined) quantum observables will
be considered a consequence, or even a synonym, of what he
called indeterminacy. Whether or not this identification is jus-
tified is certainly negotiable; but in what follows this is taken
for granted.
The term value indefiniteness has been stimulated by recur-
sion theory [1–3], and in particular by partial functions [4] –
indeed the notion of partiality has not diffused into physical
theory formation, and might even appear alien to the very no-
tion of functional value assignments – and yet it appears to
be necessary [5–7] if one insists (somewhat superficially) on
classical interpretations of quantized systems.
Value indefiniteness/indeterminacy will be contrasted with
some related interpretations and approaches, in particular,
with contextuality. Indeed, I believe that contextuality was
rather foreign to Itamar Pitowsky’s thinking: the term “con-
textuality” appears marginally – as in “a different context”
– in his book Quantum Probability - Quantum Logic [8],
nowhere in his reviews on Boole-Bell type inequalities [9, 10],
and mostly with reference to contextual quantum probabilities
in his late writings [11]. The emphasis on value indefinite-
ness/indeterminacy was, I believe, independently shared by
Asher Peres as well as Ernst Specker.
I met Itamar Pitowsky [12] personally rather late; after he
gave a lecture entitled “All Bell Inequalities” in Vienna [13]
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on September 6th, 2000. Subsequent discussions resulted in
a joint paper [14] (stimulating further research [15, 16]). It
presents an application of his correlation polytope method [8–
10, 17, 18] to more general configurations than had been stud-
ied before. Thereby semi-automated symbolic as well as nu-
meric computations have been used.
Nevertheless, the violations of what Boole called [19,
p. 229] “conditions of possible experience,” obtained through
solving the hull problem of classical correlation polytopes,
was just one route to quantum indeterminacy pursued by Ita-
mar Pitowsky. One could identify at least two more pas-
sages he contributed to: One approach [11, 20] compares
differences of classical with quantum predictions through
conditions and constraints imposed by certain intertwined
configurations of observables which I like to call quantum
clouds [21]. And another approach [22, 23] pushes these pre-
dictions to the limit of logical inconsistency; such that any
attempt of a classical description fails relative to the assump-
tions. In what follows we shall follow all three pursuits and
relate them to new findings.
II. STOCHASTIC VALUE
INDEFINITENESS/INDETERMINACYBY BOOLE-BELL
TYPE CONDITIONS OF POSSIBLE EXPERIENCE
The basic idea to obtain all classical predictions – includ-
ing classical probabilities, expectations as well as consistency
constraints thereof – associated with (mostly complementary;
that is, non-simultaneouslymeasurable) collections of observ-
ables is quite straightforward: Figure out all “extreme” cases
or states which would be classically allowed. Then construct
all classically conceivable situations by forming suitable com-
binations of the former.
Formally this amounts to performing the following
steps [8–10, 17, 18]:
• Contemplate about some concrete structure of observ-
ables and their interconnections in intertwining observ-
2ables – the quantum cloud.
• Find all two-valued states of that quantum cloud. (In the
case of “contextual inequalities” [24] include all varia-
tions of true/1 and false/0, irrespective of exclusivity;
thereby often violating the Kolmogorovian axioms of
probability theory even within a single context.)
• Depending on one’s preferences, form all (joint) proba-
bilities and expectations.
• For each of these two-valued states, evaluate the joint
probabilities and expectations as products of the single
particle probabilities and expectations they are formed
of (this reflects statistical independence of the con-
stituent observables).
• For each of the two-valued states, form a tuple contain-
ing these relevant (joint) probabilities and expectations.
• Interpret this tuple as a vector.
• Consider the set of all such vectors – there are as many
as there are two-valued states, and their dimension de-
pends on the number of (joint) probabilities and expec-
tations considered – and interpret them as vertices form-
ing a convex polytope.
• The convex combination of all conceivable two-valued
states yields the surface of this polytope; such that every
point inside its convex hull corresponds to a classical
probability distribution.
• Determine the conditions of possible experience by
solving the hull problem – that is, by computing the
hyperplaneswhich determine the inside–versus–outside
criteria for that polytope. These then can serve as nec-
essary criteria for all classical probabilities and expec-
tations considered.
The systematic application of this method yields necessary
criteria for classical probabilities and expectations which are
violated by the quantum probabilities and expectations. Since
I have reviewed this subject exhaustively [25, Sect. 12.9] (see
also Ref. [26]) I have just sketched it to obtain a taste for its
relevance for quantum indeterminacy. As is often the case
in mathematical physics the method seems to have been en-
visioned independently a couple of times. From its (to the
best of my knowledge) inception by Boole [19] it has been
discussed in the measure theoretic context by Chochet the-
ory [27] and by Vorobev [28]. Froissart [29, 30] might have
been the first explicitly proposing it as a method to general-
ized Bell-type inequalities. I suggested its usefulness for non-
Boolean cases [31] with “enough” two-valued states; prefer-
able sufficiently many to allow a proper distinction/separation
of all observables (cf. Kochen and Specker’s Theorem 0 [32,
p. 67]). Consideration of the pentagon/pentagram logic – that
is, five cyclically intertwined contexts/blocks/Boolean subal-
gebras/cliques/orthonormal bases popularized the subject and
also rendered new predictions which could be used to differ-
entiate classical from quantized systems [33–37].
A caveat: the obtained criteria involve multiple mutually
complementary summands which are not all simultaneously
measurable. Therefore, different terms, when evaluated ex-
perimentaly, correspond to different, complementary mea-
surement configurations. They are obtained at different times
and on different particles and samples.
Explicit, worked examples can, for instance, be found in
Pitowsky’s book [8, Section 2.1], or papers [10] (see also
Froissart’s example [29]). Empirical findings are too numer-
ous to even attempt a just appreciation of all the efforts that
went into testing classicality. There is overwhelming evidence
that the quantum predictions are correct; and that they violate
Boole’s conditions of possible classical experience [38] rela-
tive to the assumptions (basically non-contextual realism and
locality).
So, if Boole’s conditions of possible experience are vio-
lated, then they can no longer be considered appropriate for
any reasonable ontology forcing ”reality” upon them. This
includes the realistic [39] existence of hypothetical coun-
terfactual observables: “unperformed experiments seem to
have no consistent outcomes” [40]. The inconsistency of
counterfactuals (in Specker’s scholastic terminology infutura-
bilities [41, 42]) provides a connection to value indefinite-
ness/indeterminacy – at least, and let me again repeat ear-
lier provisos, relative to the assumptions. More of this, piled
higher and deeper, has been supplied by Itamar Pitowsky, as
will be discussed later.
III. INTERLUDE: QUANTUM PROBABILITIES FROM
PYTHAGOREAN “VIEWS ON VECTORS”
Quantum probabilities are vector based. At the same
time those probabilities mimic “classical” ones whenever they
must be classical; that is, among mutually commuting observ-
ables which can be measured simultaneously/concurrently on
the same particle(s) or samples – in particular, whenever those
observables correspond to projection operators which are ei-
ther orthogonal (exclusive) or identical (inclusive).
At the same time, quantum probabilities appear “contex-
tual” (I assume he had succumbed to the prevalent nomencla-
ture at that late time) according to Itamar Pitowsky’s late late
writings [11] if they need not be classical: namely among non-
commuting observables. (The term “needs not” derives its jus-
tification from the finding that there exist situations [43, 44]
involving complementary observables with a classical proba-
bility interpretation [45]).
Thereby, classical probability theory is maintained for si-
multaneously co-measurable (that is, non-complementary)
observables. This essentially amounts to the validity of
the Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory of such ob-
servables within a given context/block/Boolean subalge-
bra/clique/orthonormal basis, whereby the probability of an
event associated with an observable
• is a non-negative real number between 0 and 1;
• is 1 for an event associated with an observable occurring
3with certainty (in particular, by considering any observ-
able or its complement); as well as
• additivity of probabilities for events associated with
mutually exclusive observables.
Sufficiency is assured by an elementary geometric argu-
ment [46] which is based upon the Pythagorean theorem; and
which can be used to explicitly construct vector-based prob-
abilities satisfying the aforementioned Kolmogorov axioms
within contexts: Suppose a pure state of a quantized system
is formalized by the unit state vector |ψ〉. Consider some or-
thonormal basis B = {|e1〉, . . . , |en〉} of V . Then the square
Pψ(ei) = |〈ψ |ei〉|2 of the length/norm
√〈ψ |ei〉〈ei|ψ〉 of the
orthogonal projection (〈ψ |ei〉) |ei〉 of that unit vector |ψ〉
along the basis element |ei〉 can be interpreted as the probabil-
ity of the event associated with the 0−1-observable (proposi-
tion) associated with the basis vector |ei〉 (or rather the orthog-
onal projector Ei = |ei〉〈ei| associated with the dyadic product
of the basis vector |ei〉); given a quantized physical system
which has been prepared to be in a pure state |ψ〉. Evidently,
1≤ Pψ(ei)≤ 1, and ∑ni=1Pψ(ei) = 1. In that Pythagoreanway,
every context, formalized by an orthonormal basis B, “grants
a (probabilistic) view” on the pure state |ψ〉.
It can be expected that these Pythagorean-style probabilities
are different from classical probabilities almost everywhere –
that is, for almost all relative measurement positions. Indeed,
for instance, whereas classical two-partite correlations are lin-
ear in the relative measurement angles, their respective quan-
tum correlations follow trigonometric functions – in particu-
lar, the cosine for “singlets” [47]. These differences, or rather
the vector-based Pythagorean-style quantum probabilities, are
the “root cause” for violations of Boole’s aforementioned con-
ditions of possible experience in quantum setups.
Because of the convex combinations from which they are
derived, all of these conditions of possible experience contain
only linear constraints [19, 48–68]. And because linear com-
binations of linear operators remain linear, one can identify
the terms occurring in conditions of possible experience with
linear self-adjoint operators, whose sum yields a self-adjoint
operator, which stands for the “quantum version” of the re-
spective conditions of possible experience. This operator has
a spectral decomposition whose min-max eigenvalues corre-
spond to the quantum bounds [69, 70], which thereby gener-
alize the Tsirelson bound [71]. In that way, every condition of
possible experience which is violated by the quantum proba-
bilities provides a direct criterium for non-classicality.
IV. CLASSICAL VALUE
INDEFINITENESS/INDETERMINACYBY DIRECT
OBSERVATION
In addition to the “fragmented, explosion view” criteria
allowing “nonlocality” via Einstein separability [72] among
its parts, classical predictions from quantum clouds – essen-
tially intertwined (therefore the Hilbert space dimensionality
has to be greater than two) arrangements of contexts – can be
used as a criterium for quantum “supremacy” over (or rather
{1,2,3}
{4,5,6,7,8,9}
{10,11,12,13,14}
{2,6,7,8}
{1,3,4,5,9}
{2,6,8,11,12,14}
{7,10,13}
{3,5,8,9,11,14}
{1,2,4,6,12}
{3,9,13,14}
{5,7,8,10,11}
{4,6,9,12,13,14}
{1,4,
5,10,
11,12}
FIG. 1. The convex structure of classical probabilities in this
(Greechie) orthogonality diagram representation of the Specker bug
quantum or partition logic is reflected in its partition logic, obtained
through indexing all 14 two-valued measures, and adding an index
1≤ i≤ 14 if the ith two-valued measure is 1 on the respective atom.
Concentrate on the outermost left and right observables, depicted
by squares: Positivity and convexity requires that 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 and
λ1+λ2+λ3+λ7+λ10+λ13 ≤ ∑14i=1 λi = 1. Therefore, if a classi-
cal system is prepared (a generalized urn model/automaton logic is
“loaded”) such that λ1+λ2+λ3 = 1, then λ7+λ10+λ13 = 0, which
results in a TIFS: the classical prediction is that the latter outcome
never occurs if the former preparation is certain.
“otherness” or “distinctiveness” from) classical predictions.
Thereby it is sufficient to observe of a single outcome of a
quantized system which directly contradicts the classical pre-
dictions.
One example of such a configuration of quantum observ-
ables forcing a “one-zero rule” [73] because of a true-implies-
false set of two-valued classical states (TIFS) [74] is the
“Specker bug” logic [75, Fig. 1, p. 182] called “cat’s cra-
dle” [11, 20] by Itamar Pitowsky (see also Refs. [76, Fig. B.l.
p. 64], [77, p. 588-589], [78, Sects. IV, Fig. 2] and [79, p. 39,
Fig. 2.4.6] for early discussions), as depicted in Fig. 1.
For such configurations, it is often convenient to represent
both its labels as well as the classical probability distributions
in terms of a partition logic [45] of the set of two-valued states
– in this case, there are 14 such classical states. Every max-
imal observable is characterized by a context. The atoms of
this context are labeled according to the indices of the two-
valued measure with the value 1 on this atom. The axioms of
probability theory require that, for each two-valued state, and
within each context, there is exactly one such atom. As a re-
sult, as long as the set of two-valued states is separating [32,
Theorem 0], one obtains a set of partitions of the set of two-
valued states; each partition corresponding to a context.
Classically, if one prepares the system to be in the state
{1,2,3} – standing for any one of the classical two-valued
states 1, 2 or 3 or their convex combinations – then there
is no chance that the “remote” target state {7,10,13} can
be observed. A direct observation of quantum “supremacy”
(or rather superiority in terms of the frequencies predicted
with respect to classical frequencies) is then possibly by
some faithful orthogonal representation (FOR) [80–83] of this
graph. In the particular Specker but/cats cradle configuration,
an elementary geometric argument [84, 85] forces the relative
angle between the quantum states |{1,2,3}〉 and |{7,10,13}〉
4in three dimensions to be not smaller than arctan
(
2
√
2
)
, so
that the quantum prediction of the occurrence of the event
associated with state |{7,10,13}〉, if the system was pre-
pared in state |{1,2,3}〉 is that the probability can be at most
|〈{1,2,3}|{7,10,13}〉|2 = cos2
[
arctan
(
2
√
2
)]
= 19 . That is,
on the average, if the system was prepared in state |{1,2,3}〉 at
most one of 9 outcomes indicates that the system has the prop-
erty associated with the observable |{7,10,13}〉〈|{7,10,13}|.
The occurrence of a single such event indicates quantum
“supremacy” over the classical prediction of non-occurrence.
This limitation is only true for the particular quantum cloud
involved. Similar arguments with different quantum clouds
resulting in TIFS can be extended to arbitrary small rela-
tive angles between preparation and measurement states, so
that the relative quantum “supremacy” can be made arbi-
trarily high [7]. Classical value indefiniteness/indeterminacy
comes naturally: because – at least relative to the assumptions
regarding non-contextual value definiteness of truth assign-
ments, in particular, of intertwining, observables – the exis-
tence of such definite values would enforce non-occurrence of
outcomes which are nevertheless observed in quantized sys-
tems.
Very similar arguments against classical value definiteness
can be inferred from quantum clouds with true-implies-true
sets of two-valued states (TITS) [37, 74, 76–78, 86–96].
There the quantum “supremacy” is in the non-occurrence of
outcomes which classical predictions mandate to occur.
V. CLASSICAL VALUE
INDEFINITENESS/INDETERMINACYPILED HIGHER
AND DEEPER: THE LOGICAL INDETERMINACY
PRINCIPLE
For the next and final stage of classical value indefinite-
ness/indeterminacy on quantum clouds (relative to the as-
sumptions) one can combine two logics with simultaneous
classical TIFS and TITS properties at the same terminals.
That is, suppose one is preparing the same “initial” state,
and measuring the same “target” observable; nevertheless,
contemplating the simultaneous counterfactual existence of
two different quantum clouds of intertwined contexts inter-
connecting those fixated “initial” state and measured “target”
observable. Whenever one cloud has the TIFS and another
cloud the TITS property (at the same terminals), those quan-
tum clouds induce contradicting classical predictions. In such
a setup the only consistent choice (relative to the assumptions;
in particular, omni-existence and context independence) is to
abandon classical value definiteness/determinacy. Because
the assumption of classical value definiteness/determinacy
for any such logic, therefore, yields a complete contradic-
tion, thereby eliminating prospects for hidden variable mod-
els [5, 7, 21] satisfying the assumptions.
Indeed, suppose that a quantized system is prepared in some
pure quantum state. Then Itamar Pitowsky’s [22, 23] indeter-
minacy principle states that – relative to the assumptions; in
particular, global classical value definiteness for all observ-
ables involved, as well as context-independence of observ-
ables in which contexts intertwine – any other distinct (non-
collinear) observable which is not orthogonal can neither oc-
cur nor not occur. This can be seen as an extension of both
Gleason’s theorem [46, 97] as well as the Kochen-Specker
theorem [32] implying and utilizing the non-existence of any
two-valued global truth assignments on even finite quantum
clouds.
For the sake of a concrete example consider the two
TIFS and TITS clouds – that is, logics with 35 inter-
twined binary observables (propositions) in 24 contexts
– depicted in Fig. 2 [98]. They represent quantum
clouds with the same terminal points {1} ≡ {1′} and
{2,3,4,5,6,7}≡ {1′,2′,3′,4′,5′}, forcing the latter ones (that
is, {2,3,4,5,6,7} and {1′,2′,3′,4′,5′}) to be false/0 and
true/1, respectively, if the former ones (that is, {1} ≡ {1′})
are true/1.
Formally, the only two-valued states on the logics depicted
in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) which allow v({1}) = v′({1′}) = 1 re-
quires that v({2,3,4,5,6,7}) = 0 but v′({1′,2′,3′,4′,5′}) =
1− v({2,3,4,5,6,7}), respectively. However, both these log-
ics have a faithful orthogonal representation [7, Table. 1,
p. 102201-7] in terms of vectors which coincide in |{1}〉 =
|{1′}〉, as well as in |{2,3,4,5,6,7}〉= |{1′,2′,3′,4′,5′}〉, and
even in all of the other adjacent observables.
The combined logic, which features 37 binary observables
(propositions) in 26 contexts has no longer a classical interpre-
tation in terms of a partition logic, as the 8 two-valued states
enumerated in Table I cannot mutually separate [32, Theo-
rem 0] the observables 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 25, 27 and 36, re-
spectively.
It might be amusing to keep in mind that, because of non-
separability [32, Theorem 0] of some of the binary observ-
ables (propositions), there does not exist a proper partition
logic. However, there exist generalized urn [44, 99] and fi-
nite automata [43, 100, 101] model realisations thereof: just
consider urns “loaded” with balls which have no colored sym-
bols on them; or no such balls at all, for the binary observables
(propositions) 2, 13, 15, 16, 17, 25, 27 and 36. In such cases it
is no more possible to empirically reconstruct the underlying
logic; yet if an underlying logic is assumed then – at least as
long as there still are truth assignments/two-valued states on
the logic – “reduced” probability distributions can be defined,
urns can be loaded, and automata prepared, which conform to
the classical predictions from a convex combination of these
truth assignments/two-valued states – thereby giving rise to
“reduced” conditions of experience via hull computations.
For global/total truth assignments [22, 23] as well as for
local admissibility rules allowing partial (as opposed to to-
tal, global) truth assignments [5, 7], such arguments can
be extended to cover all terminal states which are neither
collinear nor orthogonal. One could point out that, insofar
as a fixed state has to be prepared the resulting value indef-
initeness/indeterminacy is state dependent. One may indeed
hold that the strongest indication for quantum value indefi-
niteness/indeterminacy is the total absence/non-existence of
two-valued states, as exposed in the Kochen-Specker theo-
rem [32]. But this is rather a question of nominalistic taste,
5# 1 2 3 4 · · · · · · · · · 34 35 36 37
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
4 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
5 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
6 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
7 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
8 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
TABLE I. Enumeration of the 8 two-valued states on 37 binary observables (propositions) of the combined quantum clouds/logics depicted
in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b). Row vector indicate the state values on the observables, column vectors the values on all states per the respective
observable.
as both cases have no direct empirical testability; and as has
already been pointed out by Clifton in a private conversation
in 1995: “how can you measure a contradiction?”
VI. THE “MESSAGE” OF QUANTUM (IN)DETERMINACY
At the peril of becoming, as expressed by Clauser [38],
“evangelical,” let me “sort things out” from my own very sub-
jective and private perspective. (Readers adverse to “inter-
pretation” and the semantic, “meaning” aspects of physical
theory may consider stop reading at this point.)
Thereby one might be inclined to follow Planck (against
Feynman [38, 102, 103]) and hold it as being not too unrea-
sonable to take scientific comprehensibility, rationality, and
causality as a [104, p. 539] (see also [105, p. 1372]) “heuris-
tic principle, a sign-post . . . to guide us in the motley confu-
sion of events and to show us the direction in which scientific
research must advance in order to attain fruitful results.”
So what does all of this – the Born rule of quantum prob-
abilities and its derivation by Gleason’s theorem from the
Kolmogorovian axioms applied to mutually comeasurable ob-
servables, as well as its consequences, such as the Kochen-
Specker theorem, the plethora of violations of Boole’s condi-
tions of possible experience, Pitowsky’s indeterminacy prin-
ciple and more recent extensions and variations thereof – “try
to tell us?”
First, observe that all of the aforementioned postulates and
findings are (based upon) assumptions; and thus consequences
of the latter. Stated differently, these findings are true not in
the absolute, ontologic but in the epistemic sense: they hold
relative to the axioms or assumptions made.
Thus, in maintaining rationality one needs to grant oneself –
or rather one is forced to accept – the abandonment of at least
some or all assumptions made. Some options are exotic; for
instance, Itamar Pitowsky’s suggestions to apply paradoxical
set decompositions to probability measures [17, 106]. An-
other “exotic escape option” is to allow only unconnected
(non-intertwined) contexts whose observables are dense [107–
109]. Some possibilities to cope with the findings are quite
straightforward, and we shall concentrate our further attention
to those [73].
A. Simultaneous definiteness of counterfactual,
complementary observables, and abandonment of context
independence
Suppose one insists on the simultaneous definite omni-
existence of mutually complementary, and therefore necessar-
ily counterfactual, observables. One straightforward way to
cope with the aforementioned findings is the abandonment of
context-independence of intertwining observables.
There is no indication in the quantum formalism which
would support such an assumption, as the respective projec-
tion operators do not in any way depend on the contexts in-
volved. However, one may hold that the outcomes are context
dependent as functions of the initial state and the context mea-
sured [110–112]; and that they actually “are real” and not just
“idealistically occur in our imagination;” that is, being “men-
tal through-and-through” [113]. Early conceptualizations of
context-dependence aka contextuality can be found in Bohr’s
remark (in his typical Nostradamus-like style) [114] on “the
impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior of
atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instru-
ments which serve to define the conditions under which the
phenomena appear.” Bell, referring to Bohr, suggested [115],
Sec. 5) that “the result of an observation may reasonably de-
pend not only on the state of the system (including hidden vari-
ables) but also on the complete disposition of the apparatus.”
However, the common, prevalent, use of the term “con-
textuality” is not an explicit context-dependent form, as sug-
gested by the realist Bell in his earlier quote, but rather a situa-
tion where the classical predictions of quantum clouds are vi-
olated. More concretely, if experiments on quantized systems
violate certain Boole-Bell type classical bounds or direct clas-
sical predictions, the narratives claim to have thereby “proven
contextuality” (e.g., see Refs. [24, 36, 116–119] and Ref. [96]
for a “direct proof of quantum contextuality”).
What if we take Bell’s proposal of a context dependence
of valuations – and consequently, “classical” contextual prob-
ability theory – seriously? One of the consequences would
be the introduction of an uncountable multiplicity of counter-
factual observables. An example to illustrate this multiplic-
ity – comparable to de Witt’s view of Everett’s relative state
interpretation [120] – is the uncountable set of orthonormal
bases of R3 which are all interconnected at the same single
6{2,3,4,5,6,7}
{1}
(a)
{1′,2′,3′,4′,5′}
{1′}
(b)
37≡ {1′′,2′′,3′′,4′′}
2 3
21
23
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536≡ {}4
10
7
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1
11
9
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28
22
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35
34
27
26
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31
30
15 14
17
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18 32
33 20
(c)
FIG. 2. (a) TIFS cloud, and (b) TITS cloud with only a single
overlaid classical value assignment if the system is prepared in state
|1〉 [98]. (c) The combined cloud from (a) and (b) has no value as-
signment allowing 36 = {} to be true/1; but still allows 8 classical
value assignments enumerated by Table I, with overlaid partial cov-
erage common to all of them. A faithful orthogonal realization is
enumerated in Ref. [7, Table. 1, p. 102201-7].
intertwining element. A continuous angular parameter char-
acterizes the angles between the other elements of the bases,
located in the plane orthogonal to that common intertwining
element. Contextuality suggests that the value assignment of
an observable (proposition) corresponding to this common in-
tertwining element needs to be both true/1 and false/0, de-
pending on the context involved, or whenever some quantum
cloud (collection of intertwining observables) demands this
through consistency requirements.
Indeed, the introduction of multiple quantum clouds would
force any context dependence to also implicitly depend on
this general perspective – that is, on the respective quantum
cloud and its faithful orthogonal realization, which in turn de-
termines the quantum probabilities via the Born-Gleason rule:
Because there exist various different quantum clouds as “path-
ways interconnecting” two observables, context dependence
needs to vary according to any concrete connection between
the prepared and the measured state.
A single context participates in an arbitrary, potentially in-
finite, multiplicity of quantum clouds. This requires this one
context to “behave very differently” when it comes to contex-
tual value assignments. Alas, as quantum clouds are hypothet-
ical constructions of our mind and therefore “mental through-
and-through” [113], so appears context dependence: as an
idealistic concept, devoid of any empirical evidence, created
to rescue the desideratum of omni-realistic existence.
Pointedly stated, contextual value assignments appear both
utterly ad hoc and abritrary – like a deus ex machina “sav-
ing” the desideratum of a classical omni-value definite real-
ity, whereby it must obey quantum probability theory with-
out grounding it (indeed, in the absence of any additional cri-
terium or principle there is no reason to assume that the like-
lihood of true/1 and false/0 is other than 50:50); as well as
highly discontinuous. In this latter, discontinuity respect, con-
text dependence is similar to the earlier mentioned breakup of
the intertwine observables by reducing quantum observables
to disconnected contexts [107–109].
It is thereby granted that these considerations apply only
to cases in which the assumptions of context independence
are valid throughout the entire quantum cloud – that is, on
for every observable in which contexts intertwine. If this
were not the case – say, if only a single one observable
occurring in intertwining contexts is allowed to be context-
dependent [111, 121] – the respective clouds taylored to prove
Pitowsky’s Logical Indeterminacy Principle and similar, as
well as the Kochen-Specker theorems do not apply; and there-
fore the aforementioned consequences are invalid.
B. Abandonment of omni-value definiteness of observables in
all but one context
Nietzsche once speculated [122, 123] that what he has
called “slave morality” originated from superficially pretend-
ing that – in what later Blair (aka Orwell) called [124] “dou-
blespeak” – weakness means strength. In a rather similar
sense the lack of comprehension – Planck’s “sign-post” –
and even the resulting inconsistencies tended to become rein-
terpreted as an asset: nowadays consequences of the vector-
based quantum probability law are marketed as “quantum
supremacy” – a “quantum magic” or “hocus-pocus” [125]
of sorts.
Indeed, future centuries may look back at our period, and
may even call it a second “renaissance” period of scholasti-
cism [41]. In years from now historians of science will be
amused about our ongoing queer efforts, the calamities and
“magic” experienced through our painful incapacity to rec-
ognize the obvious – that is, the non-existence and there-
fore value indefiniteness/indeterminacy of certain counterfac-
7tual observables – namely exactly those mentioned in Itamar
Pitowsky’s indeterminacy principle.
This principle has a positive interpretation of a quantum
state, defined as the maximal knowledge obtainable by simul-
taneous measurements of a quantized system; or, conversely,
as the maximal information content encodable therein. This
can be formalized in terms of the value definiteness of a
single [98, 126–129] context – or, in a more broader (non-
operational) perspective, the continuum of contexts inter-
twined by some prepared pure quantum state (formalized as
vector or the corresponding one-dimensional orthogonal pro-
jection operator). In terms of Hilbert space quantum mechan-
ics this amounts to the claim that the only value definite en-
tity can be a single orthonormal basis/maximal operator; or a
continuum of maximal operators whose spectral sum contain
proper “true intertwines.” All other “observables” grant an,
albeit necessarily stochastic, value indefinite/indeterministic,
view on this state.
If more than one context is involved we might postulate
that all admissable probabilities should at least satisfy the fol-
lowing criterium: they should be classical Kolmogorov-style
within any single particular context [46]. It has been sug-
gested [130, 131] that this can be extended and formalized
in a multi-context environment by a double stochastic matrix
whose entries P(ei, f j), with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n (n is the number of
distinct “atoms” or exclusive outcomes in each context) are
identified by the joint, conditional probabilities of one atom
f j in the second context, relative to a given one atom ei in the
first context. Various types of decompositions of the double
stochastic matrix correspond to various types of probabilities:
• By the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem classical prob-
abilities can be represented by the Birkhoff polytope
spanned by the convex hull of the set of permutation
matrices: let λ1, . . . ,λk ≥ 0 such that ∑kl=1 λl = 1, then
P(ei, f j) =
[
∑kl=1 λlΠl
]
i j
. Since there exist n! permuta-
tions of n elements, k will be bounded from above by
k≤ n!. Note that this type of decomposition may not be
unique, as the space spanned the permutation matrices
is
[
(n− 1)2+ 1]-dimensional; with n! > (n− 1)2 + 1
for n> 2. Therefore, the bound from above can be im-
proved such that decompositions with k ≤ (n− 1)2 +
1 = n2 − 2(n+ 1) exist [132]. Formally, a permuta-
tion matrix has a quasi-vectorial [133] decomposition
in terms of the canonical (Cartesian) basis, such that,
Πi = ∑
n
j=1 |e j〉〈epii( j)|, where |e j〉 represents the n-tuple
associated with the jth basis vector of the canonical
(Cartesian) basis, and pii( j) stands for the ith permu-
tation of j.
• Vector based probabilities allow the following decom-
position [130, 131]: P(ei, f j) = Trace(EiRF jR), where
Ei and Fi are elements of contexts, formalized by two
sets of mutually orthogonal projection operators, and R
is a real positive diagonal matrix such that the trace of
R
2 equals the dimension n, and Trace
(
EiR
2
)
= 1. The
quantum mechanical Born rule is recovered by identi-
fying R= In with the identity matrix, so that P(ei, f j) =
Trace(EiF j).
Note that, compared to the classical case utilizing
the canconical (Cartesian) basis for representing per-
mutations, the quantum case is less restricted in its
use of bases, and, therefore, yields an extended theta
body [134]; an issue the late Itamar Pitowsky became
interested in [135].
• There exist more “exotic” probability measures on
“reduced” propositional spaces such as Wright’s
2-state dispersion-free measure on the pen-
tagon/pentagram [99], or another type of probability
measure based on a discontinuous 3(2)-coloring of the
set of all unit vectors with rational coefficients [107–
109] whose decomposition appear to be ad hoc; at least
for the time being.
Where might this aforementioned type of stochasticism
arise from? It could well be that it is introduced by inter-
actions with the environment; and through the many uncon-
trollable and, for all practical purposes [136], huge number of
degrees of freedom in unknown states.
The finiteness of physical resources needs not prevent the
specification of a particular vector or context. Because any
other context needs to be operationalizedwithin the physically
feasible means available to the respective experiment: it is the
measurable coordinate differences which count; not the abso-
lute locatedness relative to a hypothetical, idealistic absolute
frame of reference which cannot be accessed operationally.
Finally, as the type of context envisioned to be value defi-
nite can be expressed in terms of vector spaces equipped with
a scalar product – in particular, by identifying a context with
the corresponding orthonormal basis or (the spectral decom-
position of) the associated maximal observable(s) – one may
ask how one could imagine the origin of such entities? Ab-
stractly vectors and vector spaces could originate from a great
variety of very different forms; such as from systems of solu-
tions of ordinary linear differential equations. Any investiga-
tion into the origins of the quantum mechanical Hilbert space
formalism itself might, if this turns out to be a progressive re-
search program [137], eventually yield to a theory indicating
operational physical capacities beyond quantum mechanics.
VII. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON ITAMAR PITOWSKY
I am certainly not in the position to present a view of Ita-
mar Pitowsky’s thinking. Therefore I shall make a few rather
anecdotal observations. First of all, he seemed to me as one of
the most original physicists I have ever met – but that might
be a triviality, given his opus. One thing I realized was that he
exhibited a – sometimes maybe even unconscious, but some-
times very outspoken – regret that he was working in a phi-
losophy department. I believe he considered himself rather
a mathematician or theoretical physicist. To this I responded
that being in a philosophy department might be rather fortu-
nate because there one could “go wild” in every direction; al-
lowing much greater freedom than in other academic realms.
But, of course, this had no effect on his uneasiness.
8He was astonished that I spent a not so little money (means
relative to my investment capacities) in an Israeli internet
startup company which later flopped, depriving me of all but
a fraction of what I had invested. He told me that, at least
at that point, many startups in Israel had been put up inten-
tionally only to attract money from people like me; only to
collapse later.
A late project of his concerned quantum bounds in general;
maybe in a similar – graph theoretical and at the time undi-
rected to quantum – way as Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver’s
theta body [134, 138]. The idea was not just deriving abso-
lute [71] or parameterized, continuous [69, 70] bounds for ex-
isting classical conditions of possible experience obtained by
hull computations of polytopes; but rather genuine quantum
bounds on, say, Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setups.
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